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The Role of ICT-based Market Information Services in Spatial Food Market Integration: 
The Case of Malawi Agricultural Commodity Exchange 
 
Abstract 
The government of Malawi in 2004 initiated an ICT-based Malawi Agricultural Commodity 
Exchange (MACE), a market information service project, to improve access by farmers to 
market information. MACE was intended to improve the efficiency of agricultural markets as 
part of the strategy to improve food security. This study uses quantitative methods to examine 
whether MACE has contributed to efficiency of rice markets in Malawi. It especially tests if 
MACE has contributed to spatial integration of rice markets. As hypothesized, the study finds 
that the tendency of rice prices to move together in spatially separated markets has significantly 
increased since the implementation of MACE. It concludes that ICT-based market information 
services improve the efficiency with which agricultural markets perform. The study discusses 
implications of this finding for policy   
  




The government of Malawi has been pursuing policies aimed at attaining food self sufficiency 
for the last couple of years. The pursuit of these policies have been accelerated by the recent 
global food price inflation that saw food prices double in some countries and sparking food riots 
(Okello, 2009; Chirwa, 2009). Some of the factors attributed to the food price inflation in related 
to the poor domestic policies that penalized agricultural sectors include, bad weather, poor 
performance of agricultural markets, and lack of market information. However, the surge in 
prices in Malawi is no new phenomenon. There have similar food price increases in Malawi in 
2001/02, 2005/06 and 2007/08 (Chirwa, 2009). Following the global, regional and national food 
price surge, Malawi government has strengthened its efforts to improve the performance of 
agricultural markets.  
The Performance of agricultural markets is seen as crucial in attaining food security in Malawi. 
However, agricultural markets often tend to fail for smallholder farmers who form the majority 
of the agricultural producers (Barrett, 2009). For such farmers, the market tends to be thing, 
fragmented and missing altogether (Shiferaw et al, 2006). The failure of agricultural markets for 
smallholder farmers often result from lack of access to information or from the endemic problem 
of information asymmetry between the farmers and buyers (Kydd and Doward, 1889; Poulton et 
al., 2006). Consequently, majority of smallholder farmers sell their produce in local poor-paying 
markets or at the farm-gate rather than travel to distant better-paying markets (Fafchamps and 
Hill, 2005). Facilitating farmer access to better-paying markets has thus been an issue of major 
concern to policymakers in Malawi.  
Food security can however also be attained when markets function efficiently and therefore 
facilitate trade between different regions. Trade between different regions facilitate movement of 
food from food-surplus areas into food-deficit areas.  Thus the integration of food markets 
enhances regional food security by ensuring regional balance among food-deficit, food-surplus 
and non-food cash crop-producing regions. When, however, food markets are not integrated, 
local food scarcity will persist, as localized deficient markets fail to send the right signals to the 
surplus markets to attract supplies of food grains.  
The government of Malawi has been pursuing several policy interventions aimed at improving 
agricultural market performance. These interventions include market liberalisation introduced in 
1987 and the establishment in 2004 of the Malawi Agricultural Commodity Exchange (MACE) 
(Goletti and Babu, 1994; Phiri, 2006). MACE, an ICT-based MIS, was introduced to resolve the 
constraint of poor access to market information by farmers in order to strengthen the liberalised 
markets (Phiri, 2006). It was initiated to help smallholder farmers to access better markets and 
prices for their produce. The intervention was intended to spur improved performance of 
agricultural commodity markets by lowering transaction costs, improving market co-ordination 
and integration. Reduction in transaction costs was expected to arise from availability of price 
information and improving smallholder farmers’ access to input and output markets (IDEAA, 4 
 
2004). It was expected that through the dissemination of pro-poor market information, MACE 
would enhance market efficiency and competitiveness in the agricultural sector, enhance 
bargaining power of smallholder farmers in the market place and provide a fair market price 
discovery mechanism (Phiri, 2006). Has MACE been able to meet these expectations? This study 
examines the role MACE has played in promoting the integration of food markets in Malawi. It 
specifically analyzes the extent to which markets covered by MACE are integrated. It focuses on 
the rice markets.   Rice is the second most important grain staple after Maize in Malawi. It has 
recently received attention as an alternative food crop in case of maize failure. The rest of this 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the study methods while Section 3 is the data. 
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.  
  
2.0 METHODOLOGY 
The measurement of the extent of spatial market integration still has major challenges. Testing 
whether the arbitrage conditions are met requires information on prices, trade flows between 
markets and transfer costs (Uchezuba, 2005). However, only price information tends to be 
available. Consequently, majority of empirical tests of market integration use price. Barrett 
(1996) thus notes that co-movement of prices has become synonymous with market integration. 
However, this approach has one major weakness namely, does not reveal whether price 
differentials cause trade-flow reversals among markets or not.  
The conventional tests of market integration, when only price series data are available, include 
correlation analysis and econometric techniques (Ravallion, 1986; Palaskas and Harriss-White, 
1993; Alexander and Wyeth, 1994). Following Engel and Granger (1987), the co-integration 
model was specified, in this study, in two steps namely, non-stationarity test using the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test and co-integration analysis. We briefly discuss the two 
methods below.  
2.1 Stationarity Tests of the Data  
The data in this study were tested for non-stationarity using Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
(ADF), specified for any given price series as, 
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where T is the time trend and ∆Pt is the price difference (Pt - Pt-1).                                                             
The model can be estimated with or without a time trend (T) depending on the nature of the price 
series. The time trend term is only included to ensure that the apparent lack of stationarity is not 
due to the presence of a deterministic trend (Bopape, 2002; Dawson and Dey, 2002). The number 
of lags is given as k, and εt are assumed not to be autocorrelated. The lag length (k) was 5 
 
determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The null hypothesis assumes that unit 
roots exist (i.e. H0: β = 0). Failure to reject the null implies the series is non-stationary and has to 
be differenced until it becomes stationary (i.e., I(0)).  
2.2 Co-Integration Analysis  
Co-integration among two non-stationary price series, for instance, implies that a linear 
combination of the two series is stationary and the prices therefore tend to move together or 
follow the same path in the long-run. If Pit denotes the price at market i at time t, and Pjt denote 
the price in market j at time t, the coefficient, β in (2) below gives the long-run relationship 
between these two markets only if the error term, εt is I(0)).   
t jt it P P       0       ( 2 )      
Thus co-integration between markets implies that β ≠ 0 and there exists a co-integration vector 
(1, -β).  In this study we used the Johansen VAR-based procedure (Johansen, 1988) of 
determining n - 1 co-integrating vectors.  We define Pt as a n x 1 vector of non-stationary prices, 
where Pit denotes the price of rice at ith market at time t. The Engle-Granger representation 










1              (3)                                                              
where η and γ are vectors of constants and time trend coefficients, respectively; Π and Φ are nxn 
matrices of coefficients; k is the number of lags; εt is an identically and independently distributed 
n-dimension vector of residuals with zero mean and variance matrix, Ωε. If the vector Pt contains 
I(1) prices, then the term ΠPt-1~I(0). If the rank of Π is r, and r < n, then there exists nxr matrices 
α and β each with a rank such that Π = αβ' and β’Pt is stationary. The rank r determines the 
number of co-integrating vectors of Pt and the matrix Π is the one that conveys information 
about the longrun relationship among prices in the vector Pt (Ghosh, 2003). The hypothesis of 
co-integration is given as H(r): Π = αβ'. In this study we chose the trace test to determine the 
number of co-integrating vectors in Π. The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis of  r co-
integrating vectors against a general alternative hypothesis of more than  r  co-integrating vectors 
and is computed as, 












2.3 Granger Causality Tests breather  
In order to assess the nature of rice price transmission across markets and causal relationships 
among spatially separated markets, the Granger causality test was performed. A price series Pit is 
said to Granger cause another price series Pjt if current and lagged values of Pit improve 
prediction of Pjt (Gujarati, 1995). Causality is a measure of the predictability of prices, that is, 
price movements in one market can be used to forecast price changes in other markets (Minten 
and Mendonza, 1998). Rashid (2004) argues that Granger causality can be tested within 
Johansen’s co-integration framework. For a pair-wise causal relationship, equation (3) can be 
specified as: 
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where number of subscripts denote markets 1 and 2. Causation can be tested in three ways; (i) 
uni-directional causality from P1t to P2t if α1 = 0, α2 ≠ 0; (ii) uni-directional causality from P2t to 
P1t if α2 = 0, α1 ≠ 0; (iii) bi-directional (feedback) between P1t and P2t if α1 ≠ 0, α2 ≠ 0. 
2.4 Dynamic Interrelationships among Prices at Different Markets  
Following Abdula (2005), the dynamic adjustments of the rice prices in the different markets 
were analysed to examine i) whether  there is a shock in one rice market, how much of that shock 
will be transmitted to the other rice market, ii) how long it takes for a price shock in one market 
to be transmitted to another market. This was done by determining the degree of change (shock 
transmission) in the price of rice in a peripheral market following a change (shock) in the price 
of rice in a central market and the length of time taken for the change to be fully transmitted. The 
magnitude of the influence of changes in prices in one market and prices in other markets and the 
speed of adjustment to these changes can be measured to determine the strength (or weakness) of 
the market linkages and the sluggishness by which markets responds and adjust to shocks. 
Following Chirwa (2001), the study investigated shortrun (contemporaneous) and longrun 
(equilibrium) dynamics of rice prices using the error correction model. For any given rice price 
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where Sk are seasonal dummies (quarterly); Pit is the price of rice in a given peripheral or 
dependent market i; Pjt is the price of rice in a central or independent market j; ECTt-1 is the 
lagged error correction term, εt is white noise. The parameters of interest were, (δ), the one 
representing the contemporaneous (short-run) effect; and (θ), the one indicating how quickly 
prices in the system react to any disequilibrium (speed of adjustment) or the error correction rate. 
The short-run and long-run adjustment parameters have implications for causality and co-7 
 
integration (Enders, 1995). If θ = 0, then the change in Pit does not respond to the deviations (any 
discrepancy between Pit and Pjt) from the long-run equilibrium in the previous period (t-1). If θ = 
0, and all δ i are zero, then Pjt does not Granger cause Pit. In addition, the price series are co-
integrated if one or both of the coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
 
3.0 THE DATA  
The study focused on nine selected markets across Malawi where rice prices are collected by 
both the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and IDEAA Malawi. The markets studied 
were Chitipa, Karonga and Mzuzu in the northern region; Salima, Lilongwe and Chimbiya in the 
central region; Ntaja, Lunzu, and Bangula in the southern region. Selection of the markets was 
based on availability of the data and also aimed at national representativeness.  Mzuzu, 
Lilongwe, Lunzu and Chimbiya are the major deficit markets. Chitipa, Karonga, Salima, Ntaja, 
Bangula are the surplus markets. Lilongwe, Mzuzu and Blantyre (Lunzu) are the three major 
urban (demand) centres in Malawi. The data were monthly rice prices from 1994 to 2007.  The 
data were split into two sets; Pre-MACE (January 1994 – August 2004) and post-MACE periods 
(September 2004 – December 2007).  
 
4.0 RESULTS  
4.1 Stationarity Test 
The price series from the nine selected markets of the study were tested individually for the 
presence of unit roots using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) was used to determine the lag length. The resulting residuals follow white noise 
process. Results of the ADF tests are presented in Table 1.  
The results presented in Table 1 indicated that for both periods, that is, the pre and post-MACE, 
Chitipa price series was I(0), i.e., stationary in levels while the rest of the markets were I(1) (i.e., 
non-stationary). This implies that Chitipa market did not share common trend with dominant 
central markets such as Lilongwe and Mzuzu in both periods. Therefore it was excluded from co-
integration and causality analyses since its inclusion would increase the number of co-integrating 




Table 1: Results of the test of stationarity using ADF test for unit roots 













PRE-MACE PERIOD (1994:01 - 2004:08)
Chitipa -0.033  -3.847  2  -  -  -  I(0)  -4.031  -3.447 
Karonga  -0.042 -2.063  1  -0.912  -6.620 9  I(1)  -4.034  -3.448 
Mzuzu  -0.028 -3.159  10  -0.883  -5.436 9  I(1)  -4.034  -3.448 
Salima  -0.037 -3.332  9  -1.301  -5.854 12  I(1)  -4.035  -3.448 
Lilongwe  -0.028 -2.012  2  -1.197  -9.064 1  I(1)  -4.033  -3.447 
Chimbiya  -0.035 -3.319  3  -1.355  -8.085 2  I(1)  -4.034  -3.448 
Ntaja  -0.033 -3.146  1  -1.123  -8.127 1  I(1)  -4.033  -3.447 
Lunzu  -0.036 -2.193  2  -1.246  -9.406 1  I(1)  -4.032  -3.447 
Bangula  -0.033 -3.274  1  -1.103  -12.404  0  I(1)  -4.031  -3.447 
POST-MACE PERIOD (2004:09 - 2007:12)
Chitipa -0.115  -3.921  3  -  -  -  I(0)  -4.260  -3.556 
Karonga  -0.208 -3.011  0  -0.993  -5.952 0  I(1)  -4.279  -3.556 
Mzuzu  -0.360 -2.749  2  -1.123  -6.657 0  I(1)  -4.260  -3.548 
Salima  -0.226 0.797  1  -0.649  -5.472  11  I(1)  -4.362  -3.592 
Lilongwe  -0.122 -1.821  1  -0.904  -5.370 0  I(1)  -4.260  -3.548 
Chimbiya  -0.209 -2.286  2  -0.835  -4.439 2  I(1)  -4.279  -3.556 
Ntaja  -0.182 -2.401  2  -0.820  -4.861 0  I(1)  -4.260  -3.548 
Lunzu  -0.163 -2.051  4  -0.734  -4.759 2  I(1)  -4.279  -3.556 
Bangula  -0.188 -2.039  6  -0.854  -4.965 0  I(1)  -4.260  -3.548 
Notes:   All variables are in natural logarithm. The ADF tests H0: Pi ~ I (1) against HA:  Pi ~ I(0).  
 
4.2 Determining the Extent of Spatial Market integration  
Following Rashid (2004), tests on the extent of rice market integration were done through a 
sequential search for n−1 co-integrating vectors. The Johansen’s λTrace tests for the sequential 
search are shown in Table 2.  For each set of markets, the null hypothesis of r = (n − 1) was 
tested against the alternative that r = (n − 2), where r is the number of co-integrating vectors and 
n is the number of markets. The results show that the alternative hypothesis of r = (n − 2) co-
integrating vectors is rejected for Lilongwe-Mzuzu link in the pre-MACE period at 5% level of 
significance. However, when Lunzu is added to the Lilongwe-Mzuzu link, the study fails to 
reject the hypothesis of r = (n − 2) co-integrating vectors at 5% level in the same period. The 
same holds when Lunzu and Bangula are added to the other six markets at 5% level of 
significance in the Pre-MACE period.  Therefore, rice prices in these two markets and in Chitipa 
(which tested stationary in levels), did not share the common trend with other six major markets 
in Malawi during the 1994-2004 period. This observation could be attributed to the fact that 
Lunzu and Bangula are distant markets from other markets under this study. In addition, Bangula 
market which is situated in Nsanje district of southern Malawi has poor road infrastructure which 




Table 2: Johansen’s sequential search trace tests for co-integrating vectors 
  { H 0:  r = (n – 1) against HA:  r < (n – 1)} 




PRE-MACE PERIOD (1994:01 - 2004:08) 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu  0  18.110  15.41 
1 3.218  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu 1  10.285  15.41 
2 2.293  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga  1  23.168  15.41 
2 3.327  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga + Ntaja  2  23.490  15.41 
3 3.593  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya  3  20.036  15.41 
4 3.372  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya + Salima   4  20.215  15.41 
5 3.403  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya + Salima + 
Bangula  
6 15.216  15.41 
POST-MACE PERIOD (2004:09 - 2007:12) 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu  0  16.809  15.41 
1 3.131  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu 1  21.474  15.41 
2 3.217  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga  2  23.642  15.41 
3 4.681  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga + Ntaja  3  23.389  15.41 
4 4.530  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya  4  19.060  15.41 
5 3.863  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya + Salima  5  19.605  15.41 
6 0.498  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya + Salima + 
Bangula 
6 15.740  15.41 
7 3.416  3.76 
Notes:   The critical values for HA:  r < (n – 1) are 20.04 and 15.54 at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
 
The results for the post-MACE period suggest that there was an improvement in the extent of 
spatial rice market integration in Malawi between 2004 and 2007. All markets including Lunzu 
and Bangula shared a common trend during this period. The significance of Lunzu and Bangula 
sharing longrun interrelationship with other markets during the period after the commencement 
of an ICT project indicates that ICT intervention has had an effect in linking distant markets 
through trade. It implies that there exists causality between them in at least one direction 
(Gujarati, 1995).  
 10 
 
4.3 Determining Causality Relationships  
Co-integration per se cannot be used to make inferences about the direction of causation between 
the prices. Therefore we conducted the Granger causality tests. These tests were carried out 
following regression equation (5As in the ADF tests, the specification of lag length in the 
equation is critical. We therefore used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the 
appropriate lag length to include in the regression equations. The causality tests focused on the 
significance of β1 and β2 as specified in equation (5). The results of the Granger causality test are 
presented in Table 3 They cover only the causality results between the major urban markets 
(Mzuzu, Lilongwe and Lunzu) and the peripheral markets. 
 
As shown, pre-MACE period results indicate that the null hypothesis of uni-directional causality 
for 11 out of 18 market links cannot be rejected. Uni-directional causality implies that either α2 is 
statistically different from zero (α2 ≠ 0) and α1 is not statistically different from zero (α1 = 0), or 
vice-versa. For example, in the Lilongwe-Mzuzu link, the hypothesis that α2 is not statistically 
different from zero (α2 = 0) cannot be rejected at 5% level of significance. This indicates that the 
causality is unidirectional, with prices in Mzuzu market Granger causing the prices in Lilongwe 
market. For Post-MACE period, unidirectional causality is found in 9 out of the 18 links. 
Bi-directional causalities were found to exist in 4 out of the 18 market links during the pre-
MACE period.  For example, Mzuzu-Karonga and Lunzu-Ntaja were among the markets which 
indicated interdependence between them. In other words, price in one rice market reacted to any 
deviations of price in the other rice market from its equilibrium path.  This bi-directional 
causality was however more pronounced in the post-MACE period where causal feedbacks were 
found to exist in 7 out of the 18 market links. These findings indicate increased interdependence 
of regional markets during the post-MACE period as compared to the period before MACE. 
Indeed, a test of the difference in means between the two periods was significant at 5%. 
Independent causality where both Pit and Pjt do not cause each other was found in three and two 
market links during the pre-MACE and post-MACE price series, respectively.  11 
 
Table 3: Pair-wise Granger Causality Tests by Regional Centres 






PRE-MACE PERIOD  (1994:01-2004:08) 
Lilongwe Mzuzu  -0.143  0.001  0.057  0.198  Unidirectional 
Lunzu -0.079  0.094  0.059  0.121  Unidirectional 
Chimbiya -0.122  0.004  0.123  0.035  Bidirectional 
Ntaja -0.133  0.007  0.189  0.210  Unidirectional 
Salima -0.096  -0.296  0.100  0.001  Unidirectional 
Karonga -0.096  -0.096  0.194  0.000  Bidirectional 
Bangula -0.096  -0.196  0.085  0.181  Independent 
Mzuzu Karonga  -0.234  0.000  0.282  0.002  Bidirectional 
Chimbiya -0.297  0.000  0.268  0.352  Unidirectional 
Ntaja -0.204  0.004  0.287  0.000  Unidirectional 
Lunzu -0.099  0.351  0.143  0.001  Unidirectional 
Salima -0.166  0.164  0.234  0.000  Unidirectional 
Bangula -0.064  0.292  0.117  0.010  Unidirectional 
Lunzu Karonga  -0.163  0.000  0.185  0.320  Unidirectional 
Chimbiya -0.143  0.120  0.082  0.328  Independent 
Ntaja -0.246  0.000  0.136  0.037  Bidirectional 
Salima -0.164  0.010  0.187  0.065  Unidirectional 
Bangula -0.073  0.282  0.111  0.106  Independent 
POST-MACE PERIOD (2004:09-2007:12) 
Lilongwe Mzuzu  -0.056  0.091  0.304  0.001  Bidirectional 
Lunzu -0.183  0.214  10.081  0.235  Independent 
Chimbiya -0.146  0.012  0.251  0.075  Bidirectional 
Ntaja -0.123  0.003  0.029  0.712  Unidirectional 
Salima -0.053  0.029  0.206  0.003  Bidirectional 
Karonga -0.231  0.007  0.214  0.327  Unidirectional 
Bangula -0.389  0.000  0.047  0.732  Unidirectional 
Mzuzu Karonga  -0.481  0.000  0.092  0.047  Bidirectional 
Chimbiya -0.269  0.013  0.272  0.000  Unidirectional 
Ntaja -0.305  0.014  0.211  0.005  Bidirectional 
Lunzu -0.299  0.110  0.185  0.003  Unidirectional 
Salima -0.508  0.001  0.040  0.667  Unidirectional 
Bangula -0.260  0.490  0.201  0.002  Unidirectional 
Lunzu Karonga  -0.020  0.803  0.339  0.004  Unidirectional 
Chimbiya -0.091  0.126  0.431  0.230  Independent 
Ntaja -0.196  0.016  0.379  0.018  Bidirectional 
Salima -0.018  0.034  0.019  0.014  Unidirectional 






4.4 Dynamic Interrelationships among Prices at Different Markets  
We also computed adjustments between Lilongwe and other peripheral markets. Lilongwe was 
selected because it is one of the major urban centres in the country and is situated in the centre 
where its impact is expected to be transmitted to all the three regions of Malawi.  Two lags for 
the markets were used in the shortrun regression as determined by the Akaike Information 
Criterion. Following Chirwa (2001), the study included quarterly seasonal dummies to capture 
the effect of seasonality. The first quarter (Q1) coincided with the rice crop growing period, the 
second quarter (Q2) with the harvesting season, the third quarter (Q3) is the marketing and slack 
season, and the fourth quarter (Q4) is the farm preparation season.  
The parameters of interest were the coefficient of the contemporaneous change (δ) in Lilongwe 
market and the coefficient of the lagged error correction term (θ). The error correction term 
(ECT) was derived from the residual of the co-integration vector of the dependent and 
independent market in the bivariate analysis. The results are shown in Table 4. They suggest that 
both causality and co-integration have increased over time, further confirming the hypotheses of 
greater co-integration and market integration during the period MACE was in existence.  
Table 4: Shortrun and adjustment speed coefficients 
Market j*  PRE-MACE (1994:01-2004:08)  POST-MACE (2004:09-2007:12) 
δ  θ  δ  θ 
Karonga  0.226 -0.298  0.094 -0.452 
(0.096) (0.027) (0.023) (0.001) 
Mzuzu  0.179 -0.321  0.153 -0.462 
(0.057) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Salima  0.211 -0.322  0.358 -0.374 
(0.025) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) 
Chimbiya  0.257 -0.282  0.242 -0.386 
(0.036) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) 
Ntaja  0.141 -0.252  0.164 -0.452 
(0.062) (0.003) (0.090) (0.076) 
Lunzu  0.126 -0.299  0.224 -0.419 
(0.078) (0.021) (0.078) (0.090) 
Bangula  0.103 -0.263  0.396 -0.421 
(0.978) (0.023) (0.000) (0.003) 
Average  0.177 -0.291  0.233 -0.424 







The results specifically show that the contemporaneous (short-run) changes in the Lilongwe’s 
rice prices significantly affected the price change in the other markets with the coefficients 
ranging between 0.126 and 0.257. The only exception is Bangula rice market during the Pre-
MACE period. The overall average change was 17.7%. Overall, the impact of shortrun changes 
in rice prices in Lilongwe on changes in other markets was more pronounced during the post-
MACE period with the coefficients ranging between 0.094 and 0.396. On average, shortrun 
changes in rice prices in Lilongwe explained around 23% of changes in the other markets. The 
difference between pre and post-MACE is significant (at 5% level of significance) that that 
MACE the presence of MACE is affecting the efficiency of rice markets. 
The results also showed that the speed of adjustment during the pre-MACE period was slowest 
in Ntaja (-0.252) and fastest in Salima (-0.322). On average, 29.1% of the price adjustments to 
the long-run equilibrium were taking place within a month. During the post-MACE period the 
slowest speed of adjustment was in Salima (-0.374) and fastest speed was in Mzuzu (-0.462). On 
average, 42.2% of the price adjustments to the long-run equilibrium taking place within a month 
in post-MACE period. The difference in the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium 
between the pre-MACE and Post-MACE periods is statistically significant at the 1% level.   
 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
This study set to examine whether MACE’s MIS has improved the efficiency with which prices 
in different rice markets in Malawi are transmitted. In particular it tested the extent to which the 
markets are co-integrated.   The study finds that the MACE (an ICT-based MIS) has indeed 
improved the spatial integration of rice markets in Malawi. This finding corroborates those of 
Mabota et al (2003). This study concludes that ICT-based interventions can enhance integration 
of spatially located distant markets. This is probably because provision of market information 
enables smallholder rice farmers to access better markets and better prices for their produce.  It 
also empowers then to access better-paying market and/or take advantage of opportunities that 
exist in distant rice markets. The effect of MACE performance of rice markets in Malawi is 
likely to be due to the improved availability of the market (i.e., price and quantity) information to 
buyers and sellers.   
An important policy lesson to be learnt from the MACE experiment is that the development of a 
well functioning and effective ICT-based intervention through the market information system 
indirectly contributes to the improvement in the performance of markets. This then translates to 
improved market efficiency of agricultural market and could contribute to food security through 
enhanced trade. The implication of these findings is that the government individually or jointly 
with the private sector needs to invest in the provision of market information. Some aspects of 
agricultural information have public good attributes and hence cannot be left to the private 
sector. Under such cases, the government needs to step in to provide the market information. 14 
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